Origin of the Korean War 1950

Letter of Stalin to Klement Gottwald 

and Origin of the Korean War

 

This newly obtained document is a letter Stalin sent to Czechoslovakia president Klement Gottwald on 27 August, 1950, just two months after the outbreak of the Korean War.  More than any other document thus far uncovered on this subject, this letter reveals what Stalin sought to achieve through the Korean War and sheds light on why the Korean War occurred.

The document also shows Stalin’s objectives regarding the Soviet withdrawal from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in January 1950 as well its absence in July 1950 when the UNSC discussed the Korean matter. At the same time, this document insinuates that Chinese intervention in the Korean War was planned by Stalin to swing the global balance of power in the Soviet Union’s favor.

Following the Northern invasion on 25 June 1950, the United States petitioned for UNSC intervention in the conflict and approval was given with the Soviet Union abstaining. This was the first deployment of a UN force ever. This case was considered a diplomatic victory for the Western powers. Eastern European leaders questioned the Soviet abstainment and consequent failure to exercise its veto. Czech president Gottwald was one of these and sent Stalin a letter asking why the Soviet Union missed the critical UNSC meeting. This document is Stalin’s answer to that question.

Stalin’s letter indicates that：

(1)   Stalin not only predicted but actually wanted U.S. intervention in the Korean War. In his telegram, Stalin clearly states that “to give the American government a free hand to gain a majority vote in the Security Council” is one of his goals in boycotting the UNSC. Stalin goes on to say that he wants the U.S. to “make more mistakes, and show its true [aggressive] colors to the public.”  It is important, however, to consider this statement in the context of the anti-war mood prevailing in the U.S. at the time.  Stalin’s calculation was probably that the U.S. would not be able to unilaterally intervene in the Korean conflict. Therefore, Stalin wished to provide the moral legitimacy granted through a UNSC resolution, by abstaining from the critical vote.

(2)   Stalin positively evaluated the results generated by the Korean War, explaining to Gottwald with great satisfaction; “it is clear that the United States of America is presently diverted from Europe and the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It surely does.”  This not only reconfirms the fact that Europe was the top priority in the Soviet Union’s international strategy, but also that the Korean War was seen as an opportunity for the Soviet Union and the socialist camp to rest and strengthen socialism in Europe as it diverted American interests and resources from that continent.

(3)   China’s intervention in the Korean conflict was not a matter of its own volition but ultimately rested on Stalin’s decisions.  At the time of this letter, even though North Korea was suffering from American air power, overall it had superiority over allied forces.  Yet, Stalin, even at this seemingly fortuitous juncture considered Chinese intervention inevitable, even stating that China would be “pulled into the struggle for the liberation of Korea.”  This strongly hints that China’s intervention had already been decided by Stalin, not by Mao. This should strengthen arguments that the China’s intervention was a precondition for the Korean War, as some have scholars argued. This document also leads us to conclude that another of Stalin’s major goals in the Korean War was to lead the U.S. and China into military conflict, thereby dispelling the specter of Sino-U.S rapprochement.

(4)   The document verifies again Stalin's belief in the inevitability of a third world war. The Soviet Union, unable to compete economically with U.S measures in Europe such as the Marshall Plan, the Berlin blockade and the establishment of NATO, etc, desperately needed time to recover its economy and strengthen the socialist camp to prepare for the third world war. This question was foremost in Stalin's grand strategy. As shown in the document, the Korean War offered Stalin a solution.  Stalin stressed that a United States exhausted from the Korean War “would not be in a position to partake in a third world war. Therefore, the third world war would be postponed for an unspecified period.” Unquestionably, postponement of the third world war was a clear strategic advantage which the Soviet Union and the socialist camp obtained from the Korean War.

In conclusion, this document not only explains the 1950 Soviet absence in the UNSC, but also reveals in detail Stalin’s thoughts on the Korean War and his world strategy.

( I’d like to express my deepest gratitude to the late Andrei M Lidovskii who co-discovered this document. The preceding analysis is based on a 2005 discussion we had on this document in Moscow.)

Document 1

 

Top Secret

Prague, Soviet Ambassador

Please pass on to Gottwald verbally the following message. Contact him by post if he so requests.

“We view the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from the Security Council on 27 June and the subsequent events somewhat differently from comrade Gottwald.

We left the Security Council for four reasons:

first, to demonstrate solidarity of the Soviet Union towards the new China.

모택동이 1949년 새운 중화인민공화국과의 유대를 공고히 하기 위해서.

Second, to underscore the foolishness and idiocy of the United States policy seeking the appointment of a Guomindang clown as the China’s representative to the Security Council;

중공 대신에 장개석 정부가 안보리에 들어오는 것을 허락한 미국의 모순을 강력히 들어내기 위해서.

third, to render the decision of the Security Council unlawful as a result of representatives of two great powers missing;  중공과 소련의 두 거대국이 불참한 가운데 일어나는 결정이 비합법적이다를 것을  보여주기 위해서.

fourth, to give American government a free hand to gain the majority vote in the Security Council, make more mistakes, and show its true colors to the public. 미국이 소련 없이 안보리에서 다수 지지를 얻어내  많은 실책을 저지르는 것을 널리 알리기 위해서,

I believe that we have achieved all of these goals.

Following our withdrawal form the Security Council, America has become entangled in the military intervention in Korea and is now wasting away its military prestige and moral authority. Few honest people can now doubt the fact that America acts as an aggressor and tyrant in Korea and that, in military terms, it is really not as powerful as it claims to be. 

Besides, it is clear that the United States of America is presently diverted from Europe to the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It surely does.

 

Let us suppose that American government will continue to be involved in the Far East and will also pull China into the struggle for the liberation of Korea and its own independence. What could come out of this?

 

First, America, just like any other state, cannot deal with China, a country with such large military capacity. It turns out that America would break its neck in this struggle. 

Second, having failed in this respect, America would not be in a position to partake in a third world war.[1] Therefore, the third world war would be postponed for an unspecified period, giving enough time to strengthen socialism in Europe. Moreover, the struggle between America and China would put the entire Far East in a state of revolution. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It surely does.

 

As you can see, the question of whether or not the Soviet Union should be a member of the Security Council is not as simple as it might seem.

Thus, we cannot say that the “camp of democracy[2] has no need to leave the Security Council.” Whether we leave or stay depends on the circumstances. We might leave the Security Council again and come back once again, depending on what the international situation is like.

One might inquire why we have returned to the Security Council. We have returned to continue exposing the aggressive policy of American government and to prevent it from using the Security Council as a cover-up for its aggression. Now that America has become aggressively involved in Korea, it would be easier to pursue this goal while remaining a member of the Security Council. I think that this point is sufficiently clear and needs no further explanation.

 

FILIPPOV.

27 August 1950

 

 

 

Document 2

Cable between Stalin and Mao Zedong

drafted by Molotov -October 26, 1949

Top Secret

Filippov's response to Mao Zedong's October 21st cable:

"Comrade Mao Zedong:

We agree with your view. At present, the Korean troops should not launch any assaults. We have also already advised to our Korean friends that the KPA cannot engage in an assault on the South. This is because at present, whether it be from a military or political standpoint, they [the North Koreans] are ill prepared for assault. We believe that, as of now, our Korean friends, in their fight to unify Korea, should concentrate their efforts on developing the guerilla campaign, establishing liberated areas in the south, and doing everything possible to strengthen the Korean People's Army.

Filippov"

Please inform by cable how to deal with the situation

Gromyko