(Revised) Moon's Nuclear 'Shuttle' Diplomacy Risks 李東馥

<조갑제닷컴> 기고문
“沈惟敬의 末路로 달려가는 文在寅의 북핵 ‘특사 외교’” 李東馥

좌경 문재인의 셔틀외교가 얼마나 서투르고 거짓인가, 그리고 김정은의 거짓 평화외교 전술을 이해 할 수 있게 하는 매우 훌륭한  글이라 생각 됨. 다음 번역문은 hanngill 이 이해하기 쉽게 약간 수정을 했음.

http://blog.daum.net/hanngil/12410082  문재인 특사 백악관 발표 전문

I.  미 북 Trump and Kim Jung-un summit 회담은 이루어지기 어렵다. (김정은이 절대로 핵을 포기하지 않는다)

 President Moon Jae In's 'shuttle' diplomacy between Pyongyang and Washington has appeared making headway at high speed. President Moon's five-man envoys headed by Chung Eui Yong, the national security advisor,  has leaded an inter-Korean summit between Moon and Kim Jong Un by the end of April, followed by a U.S.-North Korea summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un. However, dark clouds are gathering making things unpredictable.

White House press secretary Sarah Sanders' press briefing on Friday March 9 is exactly one of the dark clouds. Sanders told the White House press that Trump-Kim Jong Un summit was as yet 'not thing but a deal.' 

She said that 'President Trump will not meet Kim as long as Kim stays short of taking concrete and verifiable steps toward denuclearization.' The White House press secretary's remark  on Friday had to sound surprising because it was contrasted to the statement made a day earlier by Chung Eui Young at the White House press, after a short meeting with Trump.  President Trump 'directed' him to tell the White House press that he had decided to 'meet with Kim by May'. At that time there wasn't any reference to 'preconditions.'

The reason why Sanders brought up President Trump's 'preconditions' was evidently explained by herself in the course of the press briefing on Friday. She said that she was raising the issue of 'preconditions' because 'they (North Korea) made some major promises.

Sanders claimed that North Korea had pledged to refrain from any further nuclear and missile tests. In according to this, President Trump would not go to the meeting with Kim until North Korea had matched their rhetorics by actions.

I can surmise two reasons as to why the White House decided to present 'preconditions,' ex post facto;

For one, there could have been counsels from his experienced North Korea specialists, both in and out his cabinet, for cautions in dealing with North Korea. And,

for another, questions could have been raised about the wordings that Chung Eui Yong used in the briefing that he had given to the White House press following his meeting with President Trump on Thursday March 8.

II. 정의용 특사는 명나라 사신 심유경 같다.

At his briefing to the White House press, Chung quoted Kim Jong Un as having told him and his colleagues on March 5 that Kim was 'committed to denuclearization,' 'pledged to refrain from any further nuclear and missile tests,' 'expressed his understanding that the routine joint military exercises between the Republic of Korea and the United States must continue' and 'expressed in addition his eagerness to meet President Trump as soon as possible.'

However, Chung's presentation at the White House press room contained fatal misrepresentations. As a matter of fact, upon his return to Seoul from Pyongyang on March 6, Chung himself  had disclosed, that 'When Kim Jong Un made the promises, Kim actually had his own 'preconditions' attached  respectively to all of his promises.

Chung's representaltions at the White House press on March 9 was evidently equivalent to a criminal act of falsifying and distorting the contents of Kim's remarks in the context of 'preconditions' to Kim's 'promises' about the North Korea's nuclear activities.

Chung's performance was just comparable to what had happened during the seven year-long Japanese invasion of Korea in the 16th Century  by Hideyoshi Toyotomi (豊臣秀吉). When a Ming Empire con-man (사깃꾼swindler) Shen Weijing (沈惟敬) attempted to mediate a ceasefire between Ming China and Japan  by/ with the aid of a Japanese commander, Yukinaga Konishi (小西行長), by falsifying the contents of the confidential letters exchanged between Ming Emperor Shenzong (神宗) and Japan's ruler Toyotomi.

The ceasefire negotiation collapsed subsequently when Shen's con-man diplomacy was uncovered resulting in Shen's falsifying by the Ming court.

III. 회담이 열리더라도 김정은의 말 장난 때문에 장기화 되고 김정은의 시간벌기에 말려들기 쉽다.

it is obvious that Kim Jong-un  put to its best use North Korea's tactics choosing terminologies of self-contradictory meanings as a means to confuse adversaries.
Chung and his colleagues apparently chose, willfully or not, to allow themselves to fall prey to the North Korean tactics.
As a result, Chung and his colleagues have left the room for North Korea to continue to be in the driver's seat in its attempt to cut a deal with the United States.

Here are some of the cases in point:

Chung cited Kim's reference to the word 'denuclearization' as the base of his assertion that Kim was 'committed to denuclearization.' However, Chung was ignoring the simple fact that a 'denuclearization' in the North Korean vocabulary was a terminology that had a totally different meaning from the same terminology in the vocabularies of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. and the rest of the western international community.

The 'denuclearization' that western world refers to is a terminology that, on the basis of the assumption that the Republic of Korea is still a 'non-nuclear' state, calls for a 'CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement) of all of North Korea's nuclear material (inclusive of nuclear weapons whose verification still remains the task of the future) as well as nuclear arms development programs,' categorically denying the North Korean claim that it be accepted as the ninth 'nuclear state' of the world.

To the contrary, a 'denuclearization' that North Korea refers to is actually a reference to a 'nuclear free zone (NFZ)' that comprises the Korean Peninsula as a whole and its neighborhood that covers an area that has yet to be defined. North Korea argues that, 'since North Korea's nuclear arms program was necessitated as a means of self-defense against the threat posed by the U.S. military presence in the area complete with nuclear weapons deployment, any debate on the North Korean nuclear program should be preceded by a debate on the U.S. nuclear armaments that threatens North Korea's national security,' Or accepting North Korea as another 'nuclear state' (ninth after the U.S., Russia, China, U.K., France, India, Pakistan and Israel). 'North Korea's nuclear and missile issues is coped with within the framework of international nuclear arms control negotiations.'

Given this confusion in semantics, the argument is bound to be far-fetched,  because Kim Jong Un referred to the terminology 'denuclearization,' he had been accepted falsely as having committed himself to a 'denuclearization' that satisfies the western definition of the wording.

Under the circumstances, unless the confusion that surrounds the definition of the terminology is somehow resolved in advance, it is certain that the summit between the U.S. and North Korea will turn into the ring of a renewed round of confrontation characterized the stalemate of 25 years of the Beijing Six-party Process.

Such a long term semantic arguing between the two countries at the level of the summit is all too likely to be catastrophic. President Trump will have to find himself likened to a barking dog against a chicken on top of a fence,  seeing  North Korea enjoying the respite to finish its nuclear and ballistic missile programs  while allowing the entire North Korean nuclear issue to remain in the state of a limbo for a long period .

IV. 정의용의 말에 앞뒤가 맞지 않는다. 수 많은 도발을 돌이켜 볼 때 북한이 남한을 공격하지 않겠다는 말은 생 거짓말이다

Chung sounded preposterous as well when he cited Kim Jong Un's alleged remark that North Korea would 'refrain from resuming its strategic provocations such as additional nuclear tests and ballistic missile firings.'

Coupled with allegedly Kim's additional remark that North Korea would 'not employ not only nuclear but also conventional arms against the South,'

Kim's rhetorics are bound to result in allowing two consequences as follows:

Firstly, the allies are giving a de facto recognition of North Korea as a 'nuclear state.' And,

Sencondly, the two allies are admitting North Korea to be in the driver's seat in handling the Korean affairs, including the nuclear and missile issues, and practically nullify not only the nine past United Nations Security Council sanction resolutions on North Korea but also the entire spectrum of the hitherto international efforts to mobilize a maximum pressure upon North Korea.

It is noteworthy that, while having been the perpetrator of thousands of military and subversive operations against the South during the course of the past 70 years since the country's division, with the Korean War of 1950∼1953 topping the list, there has never been a single instance(prosecution소송) and there was no single case of its wrong-doings admitted by North Korea. When we hear Chung relays Kim's alleged 'promise' that North Korea would 'not use not only nuclear but also conventional weapons against the South' to the South Korean people calling it a 'message of peace,' The recollection of these past endless series of provocations perpetrated by North Korea naturally reminds us of the preposterous act of Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister then, telling a crowd of Londoners who gathered in front of the his 10 Downing Street residence on September 30, 1938, that he had brought back from Germany a 'peace of our time' endorsed by Adolf Hitler.

With recollections as such in mind, we cannot but ask Chung, and Moon Jae In as well, how he dare relay to the people of the Republic of Korea Kim Jong Un's all-too shameless lies that [ North Korea would 'have no reason to possess nuclear weapons North Korea should have had  if the military threats against it removed and the security of its political system guaranteed,']  allegedly calling them as 'messages of peace.'

We feel obliged to ask Chung if he can cite a single instance during the past 70 years since the country's division. The Republic of Korea, and the United States as well, has ever wavered from remaining militarily defensive in dealing with North Korea.

V. 의미없는 요구와 거짓 평화메시지임을 따저 보지도 않은 정의용 특사와 일행을 질책하지 않을 수 없다.

We cannot but accuse Chung and his colleagues of their failure to dispute Kim Jong Un's fake 'messages of peace' on the spot and of their failure to protect South Korea's young post-war generations from being exposed to contamination by the falsified North Korean propaganda that the Republic of Korea was more responsible for the state of military confrontation on the peninsula.

Even more nonsensical is Kim Jong Un's demand that the United States 'guarantee the security of the North Korean regime.' In theoretical terms, it can be a point of argument to provide North Korea with a 'guarantee of non-aggression,' which, in fact, is something North Korea already has in its own hands in the form of the inter-Korean 'Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation,' a basic document aimed at governing the inter-Korean relations pending unification, which was adopted, ratified and put into force by the two Koreas, respectively, as of February 19, 1992.

Included among the 25 articles that make up the historic document are agreements of;

- 'recognition and respect of each other's systems, respectively' (Art. 1); - 'non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respectively' (Art. 2); - 'refraining from acts of destruction and subversion against each other' (Art. 4);

- 'continued observation of 1953 Armistice Agreement pending the arrival of the state of a permanent peace' (Art. 5);

- 'refraining from use of military means and military aggression against each other' (Art. 9);

- 'peaceful resolution of all issues through dialogue and negotiation' (Art. 10)

- 'continued observation of the military demarkation lines drawn under the Armistice Agreement of June 27, 1953, and zones that have thus far been controlled respectively as lines and zones that divide the two sides' (Art. 11)

It is a matter of record that the historic document has turned into a scrap of paper beginning right from the day after the day when it had gone into force, February 19, 1992, as North Korea unilaterally discarded it without offering any explanation. With North Korea having unilaterally disowned the basic inter-Korean agreement of 1992, it should be questionable if it makes sense for North Korea to talk about a new additional 'guarantee of non-aggression.'

VI. 엉터리 없는 체제 보장 요구를 남한과 미국에 전하는 배달부 역을 한 특사들이었다. 김정은이 주장하는 것의 내막은 한미간의 모든 관계를 끊어 놓고, 남한 친북자들을 더욱 부채질 하겠다는 것이다.

Furthermore, Kim Jong Un's demand that the Republic of Korea and the United States 'guarantee' the 'security' of his controversial 'Military First' regime that features three generations of an anachronistic hereditary succession of power is a ridiculous nonsense running out of proportion as it is entirely a matter of North Korea's own 'internal affairs.'

It is beyond question that the question of 'guaranteeing' the security of North Korea's regime is wholly up to North Koreans themselves, if not Kim Jong Il himself as their demigod dictator, leaving no room for other countries, including the Republic of Korea and the U.S., to play any role.

It was consequently tantamount to acting merely as Kim Jong Un's zombies, for Chung and his fellow South Korean envoys to act as mail-men to deliver Kim's nonsensical 'messages' to Seoul and Washington.

It is also notable that  in Kim Jong Un's references to 'external threats to the security of the North Korean regime' and 'military threats to North Korea' was a hidden North Korean demand that the U.S. 'cease her policies hostile to Pyongyang.' as a 'precondition' to a dialogue with the North.

To be specific, the North Korean demand includes requests that the U.S.

① withdraw her troops from South Korea,

② put an end to U.S.-ROK joint military drills,

③ dismantle the U.S.-ROK combined forces command,

④ abrogate the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and

⑤ conclude a 'peace treaty' with North Korea to replace the Armistice Agreement of 1953.

Among other things, North Korea insists that the Republic of Korea be either kept out coolly or forced to keep the role as a back-bencher in negotiation on the 'peace treaty' between Washington and Pyongyang.

It is obvious that Kim Jong Un is opting to an approach flexible enough to refrain from trying to achieve these goals all at a time. As one of the inheritors of a 'revolutionary romanticism' uniquely of North Korea's own brand, a legacy of the Stalinist school of Communism transplanted into the North by the former Soviet Union in late 1940s, it looks rather apparent that Kim Jong Un is now trying, braving North Korea's growing economic hardships caused by the ever-tightening noose of international economic sanctions, to use 'fake charm offensives' of his own kind to confuse the public opinions of both the Republic of Korea and the United States with the multiple aims of

① driving a wedge between Seoul and Washingtom thus weaken the foundation of the ROK-U.S. security ties and

② promoting pro-North Korean and pro-left forces inside South Korea to cause South Korea's tilt further away from its traditional commitment to anti-communism and the ROK-U.S. security ties.

VII. 좌경화 문정부는 북한의 핵에 관해서는 침묵하고 평창올림픽을 이용해서 미 북 회담을 주선했으나 특사들의 거짓과 왜곡이 들통나 무산될 것이다.

Noteworthy is the recent move of President Moon's left-leaning South Korean government, taking advantage of the Pyongchang Winter Olympics as an opportunity, offer itself as a pathway for Kim Jong Un to reach toward President Trump of the United States, even without asking of North Korea's irrefutable commitment책임 to its own denuclearization. There are mounting concerns in South Korea today with a Moon-Kim summitry by the end of April followed by a Trump-Kim summitry by May now looking likely, that  Moon's conduct of the snap 'shuttle diplomacy' is more aimed at serving Moon's own domestic political objectives in the context of a nationally held local elections slated for coming June.

Notwithstanding Moon's domestic political agenda , it is noteworthy also that a possibility has popped open for the Trump-Kim summit to fail to materialize as a result of President Trump's own snap move of raising the issue of 'preconditions' for the summit. It looks not entirely inconceivable that President Moon's top special envoy Chung Eui Yong will be forced to be driven into a corner where, in 16th Century, Ming Empire con-man diplomat Shen was forced to conspire with his Japanese counterpart, Gen. Konish, to falsify the contents of the confidential letters exchanged between the supreme leaders of the two warring countries, the Ming Empire and Japan.

In case President Trump's White House stays firm demanding that, as a 'precondition' to the projected summit, Kim Jong Un 'take concrete and verifiable steps in the direction toward denuclearization' as Sanders said on March 9, it is highly unimaginable how Chung is going to retro-transmit the White House message back to Kim Jong Un.

The White House's 'precondition' that Sanders said was confined to asking North Korea to keep Kim's alleged 'pledge to refrain from any further nuclear and missile tests.'

Sanders  said that 'President Trump will not meet with Kim as long as Kim stays short of taking concrete and verifiable steps in the direction toward denuclearization.'

If Chung should choose, in his desperate attempt to prevent the projected summit from collapsing, to either 'edit' or 'falsify' the contents of the statements made by Trump and Kim Jong Un, respectively, with respect to the issue of 'preconditions,'  it is entirely impossible for him not to fail in protecting the summit from falling apart and  also not to allow him to tread the tragic fatal path trodden by Ming Empire's Shen some four hundred years ago.

VIII. 비난 받을만한 문재인의 셔틀외교로 남북 관계는 더욱 나빠질 것이고 미국의 전면전이 시작될 것이다.

President Moon's controversial 'shuttle diplomacy' between Pyongyang and Washington may, should it fail to deliver, lead to a far more explosive consequences. It will lead to the erosion of Washington's trust in Seoul as an ally, making it possible for Washington to feel compelled to go its own way alone, skipping consultations with Seoul, in dealing with North Korea.

There is a strong possibility that Washington's choice under these circumstances will be a massive military operation aimed at stripping North Korea not only of its nuclear and ballistic missile capability but also of its collateral capability to mount a retaliatory attack against South Korea.

IX.  남한은 북한의 핵위협의 현실을 직시하고 얼마 남지 않은 미국의 북폭에 대비해야 한다.

(미군은 남한에 비상계엄을 선포하고 남북한 동시 점령할 수 밖에 없음)

It is perhaps time for the Republic of Korea to be reminded of the harsh reality that, particularly in the aftermath of North Korea's alleged success in the underground nuclear testing on September 30 last year claimed by North Korea as the detonation of a 'hydrogen warhead' and the test firing on November 28 last year of what North Korea termed 'Hwasung 15 Type' ICBM with a range of 13,300 miles enough to reach anywhere in the Continental U.S., the United States is finding herself living under the live threat of a nuclear, hydrogen to be more precise, attack mounted by Kim Jong Un's North Korea.

Director Mike Pompeo of the CIA was reported to have reported to President Trump in November last year that the U.S. then had no more than 'three months' time' to 'remove North Korea's ICBM capability to deliver nuclear warheads to the Continental U.S. in advance.' The three-month grace period mentioned by Pompeo has already become a thing of the past since February this year.

To close,

it is a big question of today if the United States, with all her colossal arms capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, will once again allow herself to fall prey to North Korea's time-old gamesmanship in a nuclear swindle. 

- The End-

twitter.com
@realDonaldTrump
Kim Jong Un talked about denuclearization with the South Korean Representatives, not just a freeze. Also, no missile testing by North Korea during this period of time. Great progress being made but sanctions will remain until an agreement is reached. Meeting being planned!
10:08 AM - Mar 9, 2018

https://youtu.be/oFulGNrAvPs

 https://youtu.be/CB5H8_et-sM

 https://youtu.be/prjnHeU-u1s

https://youtu.be/RA1wjhf6ohM

https://youtu.be/Zk4mR4aD_dU

https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/이동복_(1937년)